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1. Introduction3
The  economic  literature finds  women to differ from  men with  respect to  several 
behavioral attitudes. A major result is diversity in risky contexts, where women are found to 
be more risk averse than men (Arch, 1993; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Hinz et al., 1997; Fehr-
Duda et al., 2006 and Eckel and Grossman, 2008); however on this result the experimental 
evidence is actually mixed, and shows, for instance, that when payments are high women are 
willing to take as much risk as men (Holt and Laury, 2002), a result which is similar to those 
of  other authors (Master and Meier, 1988; Harbaugh et al., 2002; Atkinson et al., 2003;
Moore and Eckel, 2003). Powell and Ansic (1997) and Solnik (2001) find evidence for the 
genders to have different motivations and/or social preferences at the basis of their decisions
(see also Croson and Gneezy, 2009 for an extensive survey): in particular women appear to 
prefer  social  goals  rather  than  maximising their  payoff  tout  court.  Moreover,  when 
interacting with each other, people’s expectations about the behavior of the counterpart are 
affected  by his/her gender; so for example  Dion et al.  (1997) find  that saleswomen are 
perceived as less professional than men; Atkinson et al. (2003), while finding that gender 
does not affect the managing style of a fund manager, show that the gender of the manager 
affects  the  choices  of  the  investors;  similarly  Eckel  (2008)  highlights that  employers 
evaluate CV and recommendation letters also accounting for the gender of the writer. Last, 
but not least, among others Eckel and Grossman (2002) find that men are expected to be 
more risk-taking than women.
All  these  results induce the  reader  to  expect  women from  a  market-oriented, 
competitive  and  “patriarchal”
1 society to  be  less  competitive  than  men:  actually  the 
willingness to take less risks, a more conservative behavior and the adherence to cultural 
stereotypes should produce such difference between the two genders. In fact Gneezy et al. 
(2003), Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) and Price (2008) observe that when people operate in 
mixed-gender groups, competition increases the performance of the male subjects
2, while 
that of females does not change; however also females’ performance increases when the 
group of competitors is of the same (female) gender. This findings appear not to hold when 
the competition involves teams instead of individuals: Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler (2008) 
find that, when the competition is between same-gender groups, men perform significantly 
better than females
3, but when mixed-gender teams compete against each other no gender 
effect  is  detectable
4 and  “the  composition  of  the  team  has  no  significant  effect  on  the 
performance of each gender for a given incentive scheme”
5. In addition, competition entails 
the possibility of incurring in losses which can be either relative of absolute or both
6, and 
women tend to be loss averse (Brooks and Zank, 2005). Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) find 
that men tend to enter tournaments more often than women because of two factors: first men 
are more overconfident than women (see also Bengtsson et al., 2005) and, second, males and 
females actually differ in their preferences for performing in a competition
7; consistently 
                                                
1 I.e. non matriarchal (see Gneezy et al., 2009).
2 See also Günther et al. (2008), who find the same results, but highlight that this  happens only when the task is 
culturally viewed as a “male task”. When this is culturally neutral (i.e. it is not perceived as “male” or “female”), 
competition  increases  the  performance  of both  genders. Apparently  women  do not dislike  competition per se,  but 
dislike to compete against men. 
3 However there could  be some  nurture effect that explains this  result:  Booth  and Nolen (2009) find  that women 
educated in female schools (where they are used to compete only against other females) are as competitive as men when 
examined in the framework of a field quasi-experiment, but men are more competitive than women educated in mixed-
gender schools, where they are used to face also people of the opposite sex. 
4 This means that in this case either competition is less important as a motivation, or the benefits from competing are 
offset by the composition of the team. In either case this may explain why men tend to dislike team-based competition 
compared to individual competition (Dargnies, 2009). 
5 Ivanova-Stenzel and Kübler (2008), p. 17. 
6 Here I am referring to a comparison between piece-rate payments and tournament schemes (see further in the paper).   
7 Nekby et al., (2008) show that (over)confidence pays off in terms of the results in competitive races, however this 
result is not conclusive, as in some environments an excess of confidence can be detrimental for performance (Biais et 
al., 2005 and Sjögren Lindquist and Säve-Söderbergh, 2009).4
with  these  results,  also  Kleinjans  (2009) and  Fletschener  et  al.  (forthcoming) find  that 
women tend to “shy away” from competition. The experimental setting of  Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) offers two payment schemes to the participants: these have to perform a 
given task (namely solving mazes) under either a non competitive or a competitive (called 
tournament) rule. In the first case they get a piece-rate payment for each maze that they 
solve; in the second case, only the best performer of each group gets paid a given sum for 
each solved maze, the unit payment under this rule is much higher than the unit payment 
under the piece-rate scheme; as a consequence high-ability players have incentive to choose 
the tournament.
However, after entering a competition which involves the repetition of a task (game)
and under some conditions, men and women tend to show no gender-related difference in 
their  performance,  although  initially  females  perform  significantly  worse  than  males
(Vandergrift and Yavas, 2009)
8; in any case the authors also find that this convergence of 
performances is conditional to the treatment, i.e. it does not occur, if some rules of the game 
change. Actually the female subjects in the experiment of Schwieren and Weichselbaumer 
(2009) perform significantly worse than males in a competitive environment (and try to deal 
with the problem by cheating the experimenter).
The extant literature provides a number of explanations about why women and men 
tend to evaluate competition differently; in particular the difference is likely to be not only 
genetic. Brown and Taylor (2000) and Croson and Gneezy (2009) conclude that females are 
more sensitive than men to the context in which they operate; in other words the behavior of 
males  tends to  be  more  stable  than  that  of  women  across  different  environments  and 
situations. This may depend on several causes, for instance women are more vulnerable to 
stress (Li et al., 2006), have a lower valuation of  earnings than men (Kanazawa, 2005; 
Walker, 2006), prefer to spend time in child caring (see for example Joy, 2006), prefer 
activities involving social values rather than competition (Sirard et al., 2006), have different 
expectations than men regarding working conditions (Sousa-Poza and Sousa-Poza, 2007), 
are differently sensitive than men to reference points (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2007 and Da 
Costa et al., 2008), have different preferences than men for the same jobs (Rosenbloom et 
al., 2008), have different beliefs than men about the strategic behavior of the others (Castillo 
and Cross, 2008 and Aguiar et al., 2009), are more sensitive than men to the stakes of the 
game (Antonovics et al., 2009)
9 and, at least at young ages, are more subject to hormonal 
cycles (Buser, 2009). In addition different gender-specific traits of personality can help to 
explain differences in behavior (Semykina and Linz, 2007). Some authors (Gjerberg, 2002; 
Atkinson  et  al.,  2003) argue  that  the  stereotypes  of  a  specific  culture  can  be  partially 
responsible  of  the  difference  of  behavior between  males  and  females  in  some  specific 
contexts. And last but not least, Gneezy et al.  (2009) find  that women from matrilineal 
societies are more competitive than men from the same societies providing strong support 
for  the  context-specific  hypothesis. However  to  investigate  on which  are  the 
biological/environmental explanations of the detected gender differences is not among the 
aims of this work.
This paper employs a double tournament setting to study 1) whether men and women 
differ in their preferences for competition, 2) whether people who reveal a preference for 
competing in a tournament actually perform better than those who prefer a non-competitive 
framework, and 3) whether in a non-competitive setting people, who actually choose to play 
a tournament, perform better than individuals who reveal a distaste for competition. In order 
to investigate these three points, I run an experiment in which the subjects must perform a 
                                                
8 See also Cotton et al. (2010). 
9 However O’Toole (2009) finds evidence against this result: the performance of male and female competitors in a 
marathon running is equally affected by a change in the value of the prize. 5
boring task; the remuneration for the task is either piece-rate or based on the ranking in a
tournament (basically  the  two  rules  mirror  Niederle  and  Vesterlund,  2007).  People  can 
choose which “contract” they prefer by participating to a sealed-envelope auction, where the 
two payment schemes are auctioned. Then the work starts (see the next section for further 
details). The results of the paper reveal that: 1) women actually tend to shy away from 
competition, 2) women are much less sensitive than men to the incentives of competition, 3) 
women tend to work hard either if incentives are present or not; 4) men are very sensitive to 
the payment scheme and 5) the preference of males for a given payment scheme is a signal 
of their performance in the job (although I can not assess if this is due to ability or effort of 
both).6
2. Experimental design and procedure
The  experiment  involved  a  total  of  71  undergraduate  students (38  males  and  33 
females),  who  played  a  two-stage  game. Firstly  they  were  informed  about  the  task  to 
perform: they were given a paper list of fictitious names, identification numbers and marks 
of hypothetical exams, and they were asked to recopy  these data on a file using the pc that 
each of them had in front of her/him. Each line of the list contained a name, an id number 
and a mark. This list was the same for all the participants. The screen of the pc showed a 
grid: each line of the list on the paper form had to be recopied in a line of the grid on the 
screen; the structure of the tables on the paper form and on the screen was the same. The
subjects would have been paid a certain amount of money for each line (name, id number 
and mark) copied correctly; in case of mistake the pc programme signalled the error, that 
they  had  to  correct  before  filling in  the  following  line (the  programme  automatically 
prevented them to proceed in case of mistake). The subjects were told that the duration of 
the task was 45 minutes, after which the programme would have automatically interrupted 
the work. At this point all the participants were allowed to practice the task for five minutes.
At the end of the period of practice, the participants were presented two possible 
remuneration schemes: a piece-rate and a tournament. Under the first rule, each of them 
would  have  received 0.15€  for  each line  copied  correctly  in the  45  minutes;  under  the 
tournament  scheme,  the payment would  have  depended on the relative position of  each 
player in a ranking based on his/her performance. In particular, considering the distribution 
of the individual performances (i.e. the number of copied lines) the players falling in the 
highest third of the distribution would have obtained 0.25€ per copied line, whereas the 
other two thirds would have been paid 0.10€ per line. The structure of the payments is such
that the median value per line in the tournament is equal to the payment per line in the piece-
rate scheme. Let us refer to the tournament scheme as “contract A” and to piece-rate scheme 
as “contract B”. The “job market” offered 71 positions (one for each experimental subject), 
of which one half submitted to contract A and one half to contract B. The subjects were 
invited to bid for their preferred contract (either A or B), knowing that, for each of the two 
contracts, in  order to  win the auction the bids had  to fall in the highest  quartile of the 
distribution of the bids. The other participants would have had randomly assigned a contract 
(either  A  or  B)  with  probability  50%,  independently  of  their  preference. The  players 
expressed  their  bids  as  a  percentage of  their  final  payment,  and  could  bid  any  amount 
between 0% and 100%. At the end of the experiment the net payment for each participant 
was thus calculated as (1 – bid) * gross payment. As usual in auctions, only the winners had 
to pay their bids, whereas those who were randomly assigned a contract paid nothing. This 
mechanism allows for evaluating the intensity of the preference of each player for a given 
contract. 
After the contracts had been either bought through the auction or randomly assigned, 
each participant was informed about her/his own contract and the work began. With this 
experiment it is  thus  possible  to  test  if  players  of  a  given  gender  prefer  to  engage  in 
competition  more  than  the  players  of  the  other  sex,  if  competition  does  enhance 
performance, if those who would have preferred to engage in competition, but were assigned 
contract  B,  are  more  performing  than  those  who  chose  B  and  were  assigned  B,  and 
eventually  if  the  performance  of  those  who  would  prefer contract  B  but  were  assigned 
contract A is different from the performance of those who chose and were assigned contract 
A. Basically these last two points provide some indication about the signalling value of the 
choice in the auction: if competition is chosen by more able people, these should perform 
better than those who choose to avoid competition also in a non competitive environment. 
The main advantage of this design with respect to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) is 
that we can observe also the behavior of those people who would have liked to compete, but 7
play under the piece-rate contract and vice versa. The fact that some players did not obtain 
their  preferred  contract  allows  for  testing  whether  the  preference  for  a  given  payment 
scheme  reveals  some  information  about  the  future  performance  of  the  subject.  This  is 
testable by comparing the actual performance of those who obtained the preferred contract 
to the performance of the players who were assigned the contract that they did not choose.8
3. Results
First of all I analyze the gender-specific preferences for competition: I look at the 
average bid for the preferred contract (either A or B), and then separately at the bids for 
participating the tournament or for accepting the piece-rate payment rule. These results are 
summarized in Table I, which shows that on average males and females bade the same 
amount
10 for  the  preferred  contract  (the  difference  is  not  significant).  However  it  is 
interesting to notice that males tend to bid more for participating the tournament than for 
accepting the piece-rate scheme, whilst females do exactly the opposite: they bade more to 
“buy” contract B than to “buy” contract A. In addition (although this differences are not 
significant), women bade more than men for contract B than for contract A. These results
are in line with the extant literature, as our female participants seem to be less in favour of 
competition than men (despite the lack of significance of the differences between the two
means). It is also worthy to notice that 37 players (of which 21 men) bade for contract A, 
and 34 (of which 12 males) for contract B. This means that more women than men bade for 
contract B, and this difference is significant at 95% level. 
Table  II summarizes  the  results  of  the  work  performed  by  subjects;  namely  the 
number of lines copied from the paper forms to the grid on the pc is analyzed as for the two 
contracts and the gender. At first, I consider the contract under which the subjects actually
worked, without differentiating them according to their preferences; in other words some of 
the subjects who played under contract A actually bade for contract B and vice versa. This 
implies that I am analyzing the effect of competition per se, without paying attention to the 
preference revealed by subjects. I find two interesting results: first there is no significant 
difference in performance between males and females under contract A, but under contract 
B female participants perform better than males. Second, while women’s performance does 
not change with the incentive to perform better (the difference between the average number 
of lines copied under the two schemes is virtually zero in this sub-sample), men perform 
significantly worse if the payment is piece-rate rather than related to the position in the rank; 
in  addition,  while  men  perform  slightly  better  than  women  under  contract  A  (but  the 
difference is not significant), they perform worse than women (and this time the difference 
is significant) under contract B. This suggests that competition is an incentive for men, but 
not  for  women  and  apparently  females tried  to  do  for their best  irrespectively  of  the 
incentive scheme.
Now let us turn to the analysis of performance according to the preferred contract 
(i.e. the contract for which the player bade), instead of the assigned contract. In other words 
players are now grouped according to the type of contract they bade for, irrespectively of the 
contract they were actually assigned. The results of this analysis are summarized in Table 
III. Here we can notice that, on average, players who preferred contract A performed better 
than those  who  bade  for  contract  B.  However  this  result  is  determined by  the  male
component of the whole sample: while men who revealed to prefer the tournament scheme 
to the piece-rate payment performed significantly better than those who bade for for the 
piece-rate rule, there is virtually no difference in the female sub-sample. This means that 
while males who chose contract A either signalled their higher relative ability or responded 
to the incentives of competition, females actually did neither of these two things. 
In  order  to  disentangle  the  two  possible  explanations  for  the  male  sub-group,  I
compute the correlation between the bid for each type of contract and the actual performance 
of the player. We observe that, for the whole sample, there is no significant correlation 
between these two variables; in particular the correlation is 0.21 between bids for contract A 
and number of lines copied, and 0.25 (surprisingly positive!) when contract B is considered,
                                                
10 Remember that this amount is expressed as a percentage of the final payment. 9
and however none of these correlations is significant at any conventional level. The picture 
changes if we divide the sample according to the gender of the players: considering only 
males, we observe that the correlation between the number of copied lines and the bid for 
participating to the tournament scheme is equal to 0.61 and it is significant at 99% level; for 
the  female  sub-group  the  correlation (-0.17) is  negative (!),  although not  significant. 
Considering now the correlation between the performance and the preference for contract B 
we obtain -0.16 (non significant) for males and 0.33 (non significant) for females. These 
figures suggest two observations: first, the more a man bade for working in the competitive 
environment, the more performing he was independently of the contract actually assigned; 
this means that bids are a reliable signal for the actual ability (or effort) of male subjects 
(despite the possible presence of overconfidence
11). Second, although the correlations for the 
female sub-sample are never significant, the sign is the opposite of the expected one. Indeed 
low-ability players are expected to prefer the piece-rate scheme, and high-ability players to 
prefer the tournament; if this is the case, the correlation between the bid and the performance 
should be positive if the subject bids for contract A and negative in the other case (which is 
exactly what we observe for males). Of course the presence of some overconfidence can 
lead to results weaker than expected, but the observed reversal of the expected sign is a very 
strong result, especially because it holds for women, whom the extant literature tends to find 
less overconfident than men. My female subjects display the opposite behavior; this suggests 
that, while men are able to select the group which is the most profitable for them, women are 
not (and probably they select themselves in a perverse way).
The results summarized in Table III and in the previous paragraph raise the doubt 
that the results observed in Tables II and III may depend on the ability of males to self-select 
according to their actual capacity, rather than on the fact that they respond to incentives, 
whereas women do not. In order to test for this, I analyze the performance controlling for 
both the revealed preference and the contract actually obtained. Tables IV and V compare 
subjects’ performances, given both their preferred contract and that which they were actually 
assigned. These tables allow for disentangling the “incentive effect” due to the payment 
scheme and the “signalling effect” expressed by subjects during the auction. The figures 
presented in the tables suggest that a signalling component is present, especially for males. 
When the preferred contract is A, there is no significant difference in subjects’ performance 
as for the contract actually assigned; this suggests that those who would have preferred to 
enter the tournament exert the same (from a statistical point of view) effort in accomplishing 
their task, no matter their contract; it is also interesting to notice that women who chose to 
enter  the  tournament  perform  better under  contract  B  than  under  the  preferred  contract 
(however this difference is not significant at any conventional level). When contract B is 
preferred,  the  players  who participate  the tournament  display  a  better  performance  than 
those who actually got contract B: however the differences are small and not significant. 
More interestingly, among those who preferred contract B to contract A, women perform 
better than men always and the difference is significant. 
This reinforces the previous conclusion that women are less sensitive to the incentive 
of competition than men are: they either do not change their productivity in response to the 
incentive, or do not perceive it as a stimulus to self-select properly according to their actual 
skills (in practice it is likely that they do not adjust their requests of wage for their actual 
skills), or both. However the most relevant results are those displayed in the lower half of 
Table V. Here we can notice that people who bade for contract A, but were actually assigned 
contract B, perform much better than players who bade for contract B and did obtain it. This 
result is in favour of a strong signalling effect: people who actually bade for participating the 
                                                
11 However notice that the results shown here indicate that, on average, overconfidence is a minor problem, as men who 
bade for participating to the tournament are, if anything, at least not worse than males who bade for the non competitive 
contract. 10
tournament are those who effectively display a better performance. However this result is 
much  more  robust  for  men  than  for  women:  the  difference  for  women is  in  fact  only 
marginally significant, and, in addition and as already known, women under contract B work 
harder  than  men  under  the  same  payment  scheme.  Summarising:  males’  preference  for 
competition is a signal of their actual productivity (due either to their ability, or to their 
effort, or to both), whereas the preferences expressed by females are weaker (if present) 
indicators of their actual performance. 11
4. Conclusions
A conclusion that we can retrieve from the analysis of the presented results is that 
men are both more sensitive to incentives and more prone to signal their ability than women
are; moreover women tend to accomplish the assigned task as well as they can, (almost) 
independently  of  the  incentive  scheme.  These  results  can  help  to explain  the  wage  gap 
between genders: on the one hand women do not care too much for incentives and work 
hard also when these are absent; of course this induces employers to incentivate (i.e. pay) 
them less, as the net marginal gain for the employer is much lower for a female than for a 
male worker
12. On the other hand women appear to be less prone (or less interested) to 
signal their possible performance asking for incentives, hence it is likely that they bargain 
less than men with the employer. Last but not least our results tend to confirm that women 
really shy away from competition; according to my data a possible explanation is that they 
do not perceive competition as a valuable incentive to put more effort in their job. Of course 
this is only a possible explanation of the wage gender gap, and it is complementary to others 
such as discrimination, sexism, culture, preferences for child-caring etc. 
As usual the conclusions of an experiment are difficult to be generalized. In our case 
I have also to mention the fact that 45 minutes of work in an experimental laboratory do not 
mirror an entire career. However the framework used here can represent well the procedure 
of selection of young candidates for a position (for example by the means of ability tests) or 
the situation of fixed term workers, when both signalling and performance under a given 
scheme play a significant role. However if other studies will find the same results as mine,
allowing for a generalization of them, the gender gap in wages would be explained (to an 
extent to be quantified by further studies) also by the fact that an employer earns a lower 
marginal return of incentives over women than over men. However, according to this paper 
and ceteris paribus, a female worker is a cheap substitute for a male worker, hence firms 
should hire women rather than men. Eventually, the recent paper by Gürtler and Kräkel (in 
press) suggests an additional remark: their model shows that the employer benefits from 
tournaments as these allow for extracting rents from the workers; however this seems not to 
hold when the workers are female. In other words: the empirical evidence presented in this 
paper  suggests that the employer  extracts  the maximum  possible rent from women also 
when the incentives of a tournament are absent. Once more women appear to be cheaper 
workers than men. 
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Table I. Bids over the two types of contracts.
Bid for: Whole sample Males Females Significance
1
      contract A 6.59 7.57 5.31 °




1 The significance refers to the difference between the male and the female sub-samples.
(figures in each row).
2 This significance refers to the difference between the sub-samples working under the two
different contracts (figures in each column).
Note: significance levels: *** (99%); ** (95%); * (90%) ° (less than 90%)
Average bid
      the preferred contract 
(either A or B)
7.37 7.21 7.50 °15
Table II. Perfomance given the assigned contract.
Whole sample Males Females Significance
1
Lines copied under
     assigned contract A 95.36 98.65 92.42 °




1 The significance refers to the difference between the male and the female sub-samples.
(figures in each row).
2 This significance refers to the difference between the sub-samples working under the two
different contracts (figures in each column).
Note: significance levels: *** (99%); ** (95%); * (90%) ° (less than 90%)
Average number of recopied lines
Table III. Perfomance given the preferred contract.
Whole sample Males Females Significance
1
Lines copied under
     preferred contract A 97.22 99.90 93.69 °




1 The significance refers to the difference between the male and the female sub-samples.
(figures in each row).
2 This significance refers to the difference between the sub-samples working under the two
different contracts (figures in each column).
Note: significance levels: *** (99%); ** (95%); * (90%) ° (less than 90%)
Average number of recopied lines
Table IV. Perfomance given the preferred and the assigned contracts.
Preferred contract Assigned contract  Whole sample Males Females Significance
1
A A 96.38 101.47 89.45 °
A B 99.18 96.00 103.00 *
Significance
2 ° ° °
B A 92.70 77.50 96.50 *




1 The significance refers to the difference between the male and the female sub-samples.
(figures in each row).
2 This significance refers to the difference between the sub-samples working under the two
different contracts (figures in each column).
Note: significance levels: *** (99%); ** (95%); * (90%) ° (less than 90%)
Average number of recopied lines16
Table V. Perfomance given the preferred and the assigned contracts.
Preferred contract Assigned contract  Whole sample Males Females Significance
1
A A 96.38 101.47 89.45 °
B A 92.70 77.50 96.50 *
Significance
2 ° * °
A B 99.18 96.00 103.00 °




1 The significance refers to the difference between the male and the female sub-samples.
(figures in each row).
2 This significance refers to the difference between the sub-samples working under the two
different contracts (figures in each column).
Note: significance levels: *** (99%); ** (95%); * (90%) ° (less than 90%)
Average number of recopied lines